The Art of Legal Practice by Sunderland, Edson R.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1912 
The Art of Legal Practice 
Edson R. Sunderland 
University of Michigan Law School 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1343 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles 
 Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sunderland, Edson R. "The Art of Legal Practice." Mich. Alumnus 18 (1912): 252-60. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 





but not for quality. But its recipient
must abide by the finality of his labor,
or lack of it. No grades can be raised
after they are once handed in. It re-
mains to work out a set of checks, such
as the penalizing of an undue number
of D, as well as E grades.
As the D grade corresponds in the
main to the former condition, so does
the E to the "not passed." Yet an in-
creased strictness may reasonably be
expected. Thus the grade E will prob-
ably be assigned to many formerly
given a heavy condition, as well as to
those formerly not passed. So, too, the
grade D will include the rest of those
formerly conditioned, together with
those who were close to the line, but
were at the last moment passed,
through mercy—or faint-heartedness.
Many other benefits may be expect-
ed to accrue as experience guides.
Thus the permission to carry a num-
ber of hours in excess of the normal
maximum may well be based on the de-
gree of excellence attained by the ap-
plicant during the preceding semester.
It is hoped that the system may re-
sult in raising the standards of schol-
arship. The new scheme has been fav-
orably commented upon by many un-
dergraduates. The Faculty are pleased
at being able to express their recogni-
tion of the difference between a stu-
dent of undeniably good parts and one-
who passes by the skin of his teeth, and
they rejoice at the opportunity to tell
the truth with some degree of discrim-
ination.
Arthur G. Hall, '87.
THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE
1.
In one respect the law is the most
perplexing subject with which a man
can deal. It shifts and changes so rap-
idly that only a nimble and diligent
student can keep abreast of it. One is
likely to wake up any morning and
find that the legislature has repealed a
good part of what he knows, and he
is in constant danger of having his
most carefully formed opinions com-
pletely upset by a new decision of the
Supreme Court. These violent changes
are not due to any new discoveries,
such as constantly enliven the scien-
tific world, but merely to the shifting
sentiment of legislative bodies and to
the powerful influence of a certain va-
riable element which enters into every
legal equation. The legislative inno-
vations are in a sense extrinsic factors.
But the judicial "variable," if we may
use the term, is an innate condition,
and every judicial opinion may be con-
sidered a function of that variable.
A casual glance through the current
reports will give one a striking im-
pression of the importance of this ju-
dicial "variable" with which the prac-
ticing lawyer has constantly to deal.
In Volume 221 of the United States
Supreme Court Reports 33 per cent of
the cases in which opinions were writ-
ten were reversed in whole or in part,
and in 27 per cent of them one or more
judges dissented; in Volume 144 of
the Reports of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York 70
per cent of the cases were reversed, and
in Volume 202 of the Reports of the
New York Court of Appeals 63 per
cent were reversed; in Volume 1 of
the English King's Bench for 1911, 41
per cent of the cases were reversed.
Other reports show similar percent-
ages.
If a legal controversy is considered
a problem in which one solution is
right and the others wrong, and if the
decision of the last court of appeal is
deemed conclusive as to the right so-
lution, the trial judges who adminis-
ter the law throughout this country
and England must be considered very
incompetent.
But the above figures are not con-
fined to trial judges. The appeals to











































































































































































THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE
States are most of them taken from
the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peal and from the highest courts of the
states. The judges of these courts,
then, who reverse lower judges so of-
ten, are in turn reversed with almost
equal frequency. The Appellate Divis-
ion in New York, as shown above, al-
lowed the trial judges an average of
but 30 per cent of correct solutions of
the cases carried up on appeal or er-
ror, while these appellate judges them-
selves were admitted to be correct in
but 37 per cent of the cases which were
carried up to the Court of Appeals.
The truth is that there is no such
thing as a "single correct solution" for
every legal problem. Two judges may
take opposite positions on a given case
and both be right. Each is right from
his own point of view.
The majority of cases which cause
difficulty in the courts are not those
which deal with mooted legal princi-
ples. The principles of the law are
largely settled. The leading cases, the
elementary text-books and the state
and federal statutes are open to every-
one, and in these the principles of the
law are stated in language which us-
ually admits of no serious question.
But the great problem which haunts
the lawyer and haunts the court is:
Which of these legal principles con-
trols the case in hand? The facts may
be simple, the rules of law may be few
and clear, but the case may be one up-
on which able judges may be hopeless-
ly at variance.
A very interesting example of this
may be found in a recent decision of
the Supreme Court of the United
States. A statute of the state of Iowa
provided that the shares of stock of
state and savings banks should be as-
sessed to such banks and not to the in-
dividual stockholders. Plaintiff bank
held, as a part of its capital, certain
bonds of the United States, and, in
making the assessment under the stat-
ute, the assessor did not deduct the
amount of these bonds. Plaintiff con-
tended that in this way a tax was really
levied by the state upon United States
bonds. The Supreme Court of Iowa
sustained the defendant, the City of
Des Moines. The Supreme Court of
the United States sustained the plain-
tiff, the Home Savings Bank. There
were no facts in dispute. Both courts
admitted that to levy a tax upon Uni-
ted States securities was beyond the
power of the state. Both admitted that
there was a distinction between capital
stock and shares of stock, the former
being the property of the corporation,
the latter being the property of the cor-
porators. But one court said that the
tax under the statute was a tax on
United States bonds; the other court
said it was not. One court said that
the tax could not be deemed a tax on
the shares, because the corporation was
required to pay it and one party could
not be required to pay taxes on an-
other party's property; the other court
admitted the rule stated, but said that
it did not apply for the reason that the
capital stock is really, though not for-
mally, owned by the stockholders, and
the stockholders do, under the statute,
in effect pay the tax. Both courts cited
Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; but
one held that it was an authority in
support of the plaintiff, the other that
it supported the defendant. Six judges
sat on the Supreme Court of Iowa, and
all concurred in the opinion. Nine
judges sat on the Supreme Court of
the United States, and six of them
agreed that the six Iowa judges were
wrong, while the other three dissented.
The question was a remarkably simple
one, and the case disclosed no differ-
ence of opinion among the fifteen
judges as to the fundamental legal
principles involved. But one court ap-
plied the law to the facts and reached
one conclusion; the other court ap-
plied the same law to the same facts
and reached a directly opposite con-
clusion. Which judges were right?*
It is not to be denied that there are
* Home Savings Bank v. City of Des













































































































































































many cases which bring out a sharp
conflict in judicial opinion as to fun-
damental legal principles. But these
cases are comparatively few. By far
the greater number of legal controver-
sies involve the application of well-
known principles. It is this class of
cases which confuses lawyers and puz-
zles courts.
Law is, in truth, both a science and
an art, but chiefly the latter. It might
be called an applied science. To know
the law for the sake of knowing it is
the harmless desire of a studious mind,
but to know the law for the sake of
using it is the high ambition which
makes great lawyers. A man merely
learned in the law is not a lawyer, and
reading will hardly make him one. Un-
less he views the law, not as a body of
collected wisdom, but as the practical
means by which society is regulated in
its every-day affairs, he lacks the chief
requisite for a successful career at the
bar.
If knowledge of the law is valuable,
not for itself but for its usefulness, law
should be taught, not as an end in it-
self, but as a means to an end. The
student should be taught the art of
applying legal principles to facts. Of
course the application cannot be made
until the data have been obtained, and
perhaps the major part of the time of
the law school student should be spent
in acquiring a working knowledge of
legal principles. There is no occasion
for him to attempt to master the sub-
stantive law. No lawyer can carry the
law in his head, but he carries enough
there to enable him to see the legal
bearing of the facts of cases which are
presented to him. He knows enough
to find the rest. But the bare knowl-
edge of what the law is constitutes the
least part of the lawyer's equipment.
Let it be assumed that one has be-
come reasonably familiar with the ele-
ments of the various branches of the
law. Diligence in reading text-books
or hearing lectures has given him the
necessary information. Up to that
point he has studied law as a science.
But law as a science is abstract, and
tends to become more and more so as
it approaches its theoretical ideal. The
scientist seeks constantly for unity, and
in doing so he is obliged to sacrifice
content to form. Law as a pure sci-
ence is no more vital a subject than
such a science as astronomy. Both at-
tempt to classify and unify a group of
related facts, but in each case the goal
is reached when the classification is
worked out. If the student stops here
he has little to show for his labor.
As a fact, law as a science is so
closely related to, and dominated by,
law as an art, that it is not taught as
a rigid system except, in some schools,
in the brief form of a course in the
Science of Jurisprudence. The various
substantive branches of the law are all
treated in the familiar text-books in a
loose catalogue form, due to the
sources being found in adjudicated
cases rather than in a code. The gen-
eral principle is stated, together with
a list of special instances in which it
has been applied by the courts. These
special instances give a legal text-book
a distinct concrete aspect, but while
they impair, they do not destroy its
character as fundamentally a scientific
treatise.
Law as an art is embodied in the
cases and no other art has so vast and
so rich a literature. If the student
would step beyond the dry domain of
the legal text-book and see how the
skillful artisans of the law have clothed
the naked legal rules with living facts,
let him read the cases. Here are spread
before him the records of the achieve-
ments of generations of lawyers. All
had the same fundamental problems to
solve, but the solutions were as numer-
ous as the cases which called them
forth. Each reported case shows how
the attorneys and the court worked to-
gether over a set of facts, tried this
legal principle and that to see which
seemed most nearly to meet the needs
of the situation, looked at the case
from all its sides, weighed the various











































































































































































THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE
order to determine their controlling
force, analyzed and applied precedents,
and at last, out of the chaos of law and
fact, brought a clear solution of the
problem.
The value of the use of cases in
teaching law has become thoroughly
recognized in American law schools.
Law as an art can hardly be taught
without them, for there is nothing
more essential for developing facility
in the practice of any art than the use
of good models. One would hardly be
expected to become a good musical
composer without a thorough study of
the musical master-pieces. The best
and almost the only way to acquire lit-
erary style is through the study of
good prose. In equal measure is the
study of cases essential to develop that
skill in analyzing and handling legal
controversies which marks the good
lawyer.
But why stop with the study of
cases? The student of composition
tries his hand at actual writing. No-
body thinks that a study of models is
enough. Why not give the student of
law a chance to try his hand at prac-
tice?
Only two reasons suggest them-
selves for excluding practice from the
law school course. One is that it is
practically impossible to teach it. This
may be dismissed with the remark that
it has been done and is now being done
with unquestioned success. The other
is that practice has no proper place in
a law school.
If practice ought not to appear as
one of the features of legal instruction
it is either because if it is of no im-
portance in itself or because it would
diminish the time available for other
more important subjects. Both of
these reasons have been given; they are
equally invalid.
It is most commonly said, by those
who oppose the teaching of practice in
the law schools, that the student will
get hold of practice readily enough
when he gets into the active work of
his profession. So will the writer get
plenty of experience in writing when
he takes up the career of a literary
man. So will the engineer have abun-
dant opportunity to do practical work
when he begins his career as an engi-
neer.
There is no essential difference in
the relation which practice bears to the
study of law and that which composi-
tion bears to the study of literary style.
The efficiency of the student must be
measured by his ability to write in the
one case and to practice in the other.
He may know how writing ought to
be done, but if he cannot actually write
well he is a failure as a literary man.
He may know how a case ought to be
handled, but if he cannot actually han-
dle it successfully he is no lawyer. A
knowledge of rhetoric will never make
a writer; a knowledge of the princi-
ples of law will never make a lawyer.
The case system is, indeed, a half-
way point in the development of legal
teaching. It carries the student out of
the abstractions of the text-book into
the realm of concrete litigation. But
it merely instructs him as to how oth-
ers applied the law, without allowing
him any opportunity to apply it for
himself. In the cases, the student sees
the finished product of the lawyer's la-
bor. He gets the same character of in-
formation from them that the engi-
neering student gets from reading de-
scriptions of new structures or machin-
ery. The case system admits that law
is more than a science of jurisprudence
that it lives not in abstract propositions
but in the shifting interrelation of facts
and principles. It admits that the law
must be studied as an applied science,
but it stops short of the position which
has become axiomatic in regard to ev-
ery other phase of practical life, viz.,
that the only way to really learn how
to do a thing is to actually do it.
If the aim of the law school is to
make legal scholars perhaps the study
of cases is enough. It is quite conceiv-
able that one could become well versed
in the principles of the law by a dili-












































































































































































ers. One might become a well-inform-
ed rhetorician, or even a clever critic
of style, and yet be unable to write well
himself. But one can never become
proficient in doing anything by merely
watching others do it. A course in
pedagogy never made a good teacher.
The aim of the law schools ought to
be to develop good lawyers so far as
their means will allow. The lawyer is
essentially a practitioner, and the
schools must therefore aim to do what
they can to prepare men for practice.
Of course the student will learn far
more in the future years of his active
career than the school can teach him.
But if he goes to the law school to
learn how to practice law, the law
school should go as far as possible in
teaching him the thing he wants to
know. It should teach him the ele-
mentary principles of the law; it should
go further, and show him, by the study
of cases how the great lawyers wrestled
with and solved the problems of the
law; and it should, finally, give him
problems to solve for himself, and
should watch, direct and criticise
through all the stages of the case, help-
ing him to appreciate and understand
the difficulties, and teaching him, by
actual experience, how to avoid pitfalls
and reach the desired results.
The mere scholar is disheartened
over the uncertainties of the law. For
him they mark imperfection and incom-
pleteness, and he looks forward to the
time when legal standards will be so
far perfected that the answers to legal
problems may be worked out with ac-
curacy and precision. He would apply
the close logic of the mathematician to
the facts and law of the case, and
would have the correct result follow
invariably from correct premises. The
lawyer knows better. He understands
that there is no absolute standard pos-
sible; that reversed cases and dissent-
ing opinions only emphasize the human
element in legal controversies; that
two judges may differ diametrically
and neither be wrong; that right and
wrong, as applied to the solution of
legal problems, are purely relative
terms.
II.
With a view to realizing the many
advantages incident to the study of
practice in the law school, the Univer-
sity of Michigan, in 1893, introduced
a department known as the Practice
Court. It was at first largely an ex-
periment, and the labor involved in de-
veloping it into a systematic and prac-
ticable mechanism for teaching prac-
tice was enormous. There were no
models to study, for no enterprise sim-
ilar to that sought to be installed had
been in operation elsewhere.
One feature of the Law Department
at Michigan added greatly to the diffi-
culties incident to the development of
the court, and that was the cosmopoli-
tan character of the student body.
Three-quarters of the states of the
Union are constantly represented, and
to undertake the supervision of prac-
tical work carried on under the vari-
ous rules of so many jurisdictions was
a formidable task. And yet it was per-
fectly clear that no course in practice
could succeed unless it were based, in
the case of each particular student, up-
on the concrete and specific rules in
force in some one particular jurisdic-
tion, preferably that where the student
intended to practice. Accordingly,
from the beginning, the Practice Court
has offered to every student taking the
work the opportunity to study, under
strict supervision, the practice of any
state which he may choose.
The Practice Court is conducted pri-
marily as a senior class course. Plead-
ing, at common law, in equity and un-
der the code, is thoroughly covered in
separate courses with the first and sec-
ond year men, and when they enter the
senior class it is assumed that they
are reasonably familiar with the theo-
ry of pleading.
The first thing undertaken is some
practical work in drawing pleadings.
As soon as the class is enrolled iden-
tical copies of a statement of facts are











































































































































































THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE
class. This statement is an informal
recital of facts very similar to that
which a client would give a lawyer
when consulting him about his case.
It contains evidence, immaterial mat-
ter and conclusions mingled with the
ultimate facts of the case in such a
way that close discrimination must be
exercised in analyzing and segregating
the essential elements of the cause of
action. And with the facts constitut-
ing the plaintiff's case are those which
are to be relied upon by the defendant.
The whole story is told, out of which
an action arid its incidents spring.
Each student is required to take this
statement of facts and draw a com-
plete set of pleadings based on the sit-
uation therein disclosed, raising the
meritorious issue or issues in the case.
He may follow the rules of any juris-
diction he chooses, and his pleadings
will be judged by the standards of that
jurisdiction. The pleadings so drawn
are filed on a given day, and are then
carefully examined with a view to dis-
covering and classifying the blunders
that have been made. These errors are
noted and, after the examination of
the entire lot of pleadings filed, a num-
ber of sets of pleadings drawn under
the common law system and a number
drawn under the code system, chosen
for the purpose of exhibiting the great-
est variety of mistakes, are selected as
illustrative pleadings for study. Mim-
eograph copies of each set are made,
and each man in the class receives cop-
ies of the common law or the code sets
of pleadings, according as he has chos-
en a venue where the practice is based
on common law or code rules.
Each man is required to study these
illustrative sets of pleadings, compare
them with the pleadings he himself
drew on the same facts, look up all
questions involved, criticize them un-
sparingly and rigidly, and be prepared
for a thorough and exhaustive quiz on
the whole subject of the proper man-
ner of pleading in the given case and
the specific mistakes shown in the illus-
trative pleadings. The men are divided
into convenient and appropriate sec-
tions to facilitate the quiz work. Not
only are all the noteworthy errors ap-
pearing in the illustrative pleadings
pointed out and discussed, but the
whole list of mistakes made by the
class is, so far as possible, presented
for comment and criticism. The aim is
to make thequiz comprehensive enough
to cover all the principal errors which
the inexperienced pleader finds it pos-
sible to make.
After this thoroughgoing discussion
each man in the class is required to
draw an amended set of pleadings on
the same facts, embodying all the
points made in the quiz. The original
sets of pleadings are then compared
with the amended sets, and the men
are graded individually upon the show-
ing made.
This process is repeated as often as
time will permit. Cases at law, both
in tort and contract, and cases calling
for equitable relief, are given out in
this way. In each instance there is the
issuance of identical copies of the
statement of facts to all members of
the class, the preparation by each man
of a complete set of pleadings, the ex-
amination of these pleadings and the
issuance of copies of illustrative plead-
ings chosen from among them, the
study of these pleadings and a com-
prehensive quiz upon the case with
particular reference to the errors ap-
pearing in these illustrative pleadings,
the preparation of amended pleadings
after the quiz, and a careful grading of
each man upon the work he has done.
Many important rules of pleading
are given concrete illustration in this
work. The manner of analyzing a set
of facts to determine the precise cause
of action contained therein, the differ-
entiation of the ultimate facts from ev-
idence and legal conclusions, the ex-
clusion of immaterial and redundant
matters, pleading according to legal
effect as distinguished from pleading
legal conclusions, hypothetical and al-
ternative pleading, uncertainty, plead-












































































































































































fenses, the theory and form of differ-
ent counts, pleas in bar and in abate-
ment, the scope and purpose of demur-
rers, inconsistent defenses, the scope
of the general issues and the general
denial, duplicity, departure,—all these
and a great number of similar questions
are concretely illustrated by the work
of the men themselves, and the discus-
sions in regard to them have nothing
of the vague and abstract obscurity
which the theoretical study of pleading
cannot entirely escape.
After this preliminary work in
pleading the Practice Court work
proper is taken up. The men in the
class arrange themselves into groups
of four, two to represent the plaintiff
in the case and two to represent the de-
fendant. They choose whatever juris-
diction they wish for the venue of their
case. To each group is then given out
a statement of facts similar in its scope
and purpose to those upon which the
preliminary work in pleading was
based, though no two groups receive
the same facts. These cases cover a
large variety of questions and are so
prepared as to involve disputed ques-
tions of law, or difficult applications of
legal principles. The merits of the is-
sue in each case are to be determined
by the general weight of authority, but
all questions of pleading and practice
are to be determined by the rules, stat-
utes and decisions of the state of
venue.
Process in each case is first to be
prepared, issued, served and returned
under the direction of the attorneys
for the plaintiff, after which the plead-
ings follow in clue course. The Prac-
tice Court rules provide that if a mis-
take exists in any process or pleading,
and no exception is taken to it by the
opposing attorneys, the latter as well
as those who committed the error are
to be held responsible for it, and the
court sits several afternoons each week
to hear and determine all motions and
demurrers that may be brought before
it. The process and pleadings are us-
ually examined and searched for er-
rors with care and discrimination, and
the multitude of motions and demur-
rers brought on for hearing in the
Practice Court covers a wide range of
questions and frequently develops diffi-
cult and intricate points of pleading
and practice.
In these arguments there is nothing
of fiction. The question is always an
actual one arising upon actual plead-
ings or process. The objections are
based upon the statutes, rules of court
and decisions of the state wherein the
venue of the action is laid. The objec-
tions therefore involve a close and crit-
ical analysis of these statutes, rules
and decisions. Such an analysis, when
definitized by the concrete features of
the case in hand, gives a grasp and
working knowledge of procedure
which no purely general study of the
subject can give. And, most important
of all, the analysis so made and the
conclusions so reached are presented
in open court under conditions prac-
tically identical with those of actual
practice. It is much to be able to see
a mistake in an opponent's pleading,
it is a still greater achievement to run
down the authorities and fortify one's
judgment by well considered opinions
of courts, but the final test of knowl-
edge and skill comes when the point is
argued, when the pleading is analyzed
before the court and the alleged error
is made to appear in what is deemed
to be its true light, when cases in sup-
port of the position taken are present-
ed and marshalled in the most telling
manner, and when the argument of op-
posing counsel is answered and his au-
thorities distinguished in a clear, log-
ical and convincing way.
The Practice Court room is large
enough to hold a considerable number
of spectators, and the senior students
are encouraged to visit the court even
when they have no matters of their
own pending there. This privilege is
very generally taken advantage of, and
the arguments arc usually listened to












































































































































































THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE
After the men assigned to a given
case deem the same at proper issue on
the pleadings, they file notes of issue
to indicate that fact, and the pleadings
filed are then carefully examined by
the instructor in charge. He then
meets the group and the pleadings are
discussed and criticized and sugges-
tions are made as to better methods of
dealing with the case and ways of
avoiding errors. Amended pleadings
are frequently required to be prepared
and filed, and upon the pleadings as
they stand in their final form a law
argument is based.
The law argument is made before
some member of the Faculty; it con-
sumes from one to two hours, and
covers the issues raised by the plead-
ings. Each man must take part in the
argument and must show familiarity
with the facts and principles involved
in the leading cases cited. The men
representing each side of the contro-
versy are also required to present, at
the close of the argument, a compre-
hensive brief upon the law of the case,
prepared with care in the manner us-
ual in the case of briefs filed in our
appellate courts, in accordance with
somewhat detailed suggestions which
are distributed to the men in printed
form when the facts are given out.
The men are graded upon their argu-
ments and upon their briefs, and if
they do not attain a sufficient standard
in either one a reargument or a new
brief may be called for.
The foregoing represents the work
of the first semester. The second se-
mester is devoted largely to court work
in jury cases. This work involves the
trial of issues of fact, and the funda-
mental practical problem underlying it
consists in the creation of the issues to
be tried. In the work of the first semes-
ter statements of assumed facts are pre-
pared, and these exactly meet the re-
quirements, for the purpose is to raise
issues of law, not of fact, and the trial
is to the court and not to the jury. But
when it is desired to produce an issue
•f fact no assumptions can be made,
for that which is assumed cannot be an
issue. Equally ineffectual is the meth-
od of coaching witnesses before the
trial as to what they will say on the
witness stand, for while the direct ex-
amination of the various witnesses
might develop contradictions and in-
consistencies, there would be absolute-
ly no field for cross-examination. A
jury trial can be of value to the student
participating in it only when it pre-
sents the elements of actual litigation,
viz., the existence of actual controver-
sies respecting which concrete issues
can be drawn on the pleadings and to
support which the testimony of per-
sons may be had who actually saw,
heard or participated in the transac-
tions out of which the issues arose.
To meet these requirements each
case is founded upon a preliminary
"arrangement," which consists of a
working out of a series of transac-
tions in which members of the class
are the witnesses and participants. The
facts so worked out may involve the
question of the existence or the terms
of a contract, the authority of an
agent, or the intent with which an act
was done; it may be a question of
fraud or false pretenses, or any one
of an almost endless variety of legal
controversies. The parties while ac-
tually engaged in the transactions are
directed what to do, but having once
acted the fact assumes fixed and tangi-
ble form and the questions raised at
the trial relate to what was really said
and done. Here all the elements of the
ordinary litigated question are present,
and the witnesses called may be cross-
examined as to the accuracy of their
memory in regard to the matters testi-
fied to, as to their opportunities for
observation, etc. In short, the con-
troversies are actual but are artificially
produced, and the issues tried are ab-
solutely real issues. The mechanism of
the arrangement has no material effect
upon the trial itself, which proceeds to
all appearances like any ordinary trial
in one of our circuit courts.












































































































































































and attorneys in the various cases, so
that they have an opportunity to view
the proceedings from the witness
stand, the jury box and the attorneys'
table and to observe how their class-
mates conduct themselves in those
same positions. Each jury is impan-
elled in accordance with the practice of
the state of venue, and under that same
practice witnesses are sworn and evi-
dence is introduced, motions for non-
suits or directed verdicts are made, in-
structions are drawn and submitted to
the jury, arguments are made and the
verdict is rendered. Every element of
the actual trial is present except the
pecuniary interest of the parties to the
suit.
Such are the main features of the
work of teaching practice as it has
been developed at the University of
Michigan. It has not reached the fin-
ished stage in all its details, for the
problem is a very large one. Every
year sees alterations and improve-
ments. The sole aim is to get results,
rather than to justify any particular
method. The Practice Court supplants
no courses in the substantive law, it
does not take the place of a thorough
study of the theory of pleading, it does
not even exhaust the attention given
to practice itself, for a course in Trial
Practice is simultaneously given. But
it does attempt to give a concrete fla-
vor to the work of the law student, to
present legal problems to be solved as
a lawyer is expected to solve them, to
enable the student to judge of the val-
ue of cases by actually using them, and
to appreciate the function and mean-
ing of the principles of substantive law
by putting them into practice.
The lawyer, like the engineer, is a
professional man with whom knowl-
edge is but a means to a practical end.
If he cannot use his knowledge it is of
no value to him. He can never appre-
ciate what he knows until he learns
how to use it; he can never know how
to acquire knowledge until he under-
stands how his knowledge is to be em-
ployed. It is to round out the law
school curriculum into a practical as
well as a theoretical course, to supple-
ment the case system in making the
law concrete, and to develop the study
of law as a science which is primarily
to be applied to the needs of a complex
society, that the teaching of practice
has taken a prominent place in the Law
Department of the University of Mich-
igan.
Edson R. Sunderland. '97, '01/.
THE OBSERVATORY AT LA PLATA AND
PROFESSOR HUSSEY'S WORK
Reports of great interest concern-
ing the University of La Plata, espec-
ially its astronomical equipment, have
been brought back from South Amer-
ica by Professor W. J. Hussey, who
returned to North America early in
February. It will be remembered that
Professor Hussey has accepted the po-
sition of Director of the Astronomical
work at La Plata, one of the three na-
tional universities maintained by the
Argentine Republic, and that under
the present arrangement with the Un-
iversity of Michigan, he is to spend
half of his time at La Plata and half
in Ann Arbor. The new refracting tel-
escope, recently provided for through
the generosity of Mr. R. P. Lamont,
'9i<:,of Chicago,is to be taken to South
America upon completion and used in
conjunction with the work at La
Plata. It will, however, remain the
property of the University of Michi-
gan and eventually will be installed at
Michigan.
La Plata was established in 1883 as
the capital of the State of Buenos
Aires, at which time Buenos Aires,
and the outlying districts, were made
a federal district. Then arose the
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